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Previous research showed that priming effects in the affective misattribution procedure
(AMP) are unaffected by direct warnings to avoid an influence of the primes. The present
research examined whether a priming influence is diminished by task procedures that
encourage accurate judgments of the targets. Participants were motivated to categorize
the affective meaning of nonsense targets accurately by being made to believe that a
true word was presented in each trial and by providing feedback on (allegedly) incorrect
responses. This condition produced robust priming effects. Priming was however
reduced and less reliable relative to more typical AMP conditions in which participants
guessed the meaning of openly presented nonsense targets. Affective judgments of
nonsense targets were not affected by advance knowledge of the response mapping
during the priming phase, which argues against a response-priming explanation of AMP
effects. These findings show that affective primes influence evaluative judgments even in
conditions in which the motivation to provide accurate responses is high and a priming
of motor responses is not possible. Priming effects were however weaker with high
accuracy motivation, suggesting that a focus on accurate judgments is an effective
strategy to control for an unwanted priming influence in the AMP.
Keywords: affect misattribution procedure, accuracymotivation, response priming, implicit attitudemeasurement
Introduction
During the last three decades, indirect measures of attitudes, stereotypes, and the self, have
elicited immense interest in social psychology (for reviews see Petty et al., 2009; Gawronski
and Payne, 2010; Roefs et al., 2011). A defining feature of indirect measurement procedures
is that they imply variability in mental constructs (e.g., attitudes, stereotypes, self) from
variability in judgments that are not about the mental construct under investigation (De
Houwer et al., 2009). An indirect attitude measure that has become increasingly popular
during the last few years is the affect misattribution procedure (AMP; Payne et al., 2005; for
a review see Payne and Lundberg, 2014). In the AMP, participants watch a series of prime
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images or words, and each prime is followed by an ambiguous
target (such as a Chinese character) in rapid succession.
Participants are asked to rate the target in terms of its esthetic
pleasantness or unpleasantness while they should ignore the
primes. Despite these task instructions, target ratings are typically
biased by the pleasantness of the primes: Participants judge
targets that are presented after a pleasant prime as more pleasant
than targets that appeared after unpleasant stimuli. This biasing
influence was explained with an automatic evaluative response
to the prime that is unintentionally misattributed to the target
(Payne et al., 2010).
Affect Misattribution in the AMP: Unavoidable or
Not?
Payne et al. (2005) conceptualize misattribution as “mistaking
an effect of one source for the effect of another” (p. 278). They
argue that people have difficulty disentangling their affective
responses to two events occurring in close proximity in time
and space. In line with this theorizing, it was shown that the
magnitude of priming increases when the time interval between
prime and target decreases and when the target is visible for
only a short duration, presumably because participants have less
time in these conditions to sort out reactions to the primes
from reactions to the target. Furthermore, AMP-effects are
stronger when participants are explicitly instructed to rely on
their intuitive feelings during the judgment task (De Houwer and
Tucker Smith, 2013). More important for the present discussion,
target judgments are biased by the primes even after direct
warnings of an influence of the primes (Payne et al., 2005). Latter
finding suggests that participants are unable to correct for the
influence of the primes even if they are instructed to do so (for
a review see Payne and Lundberg, 2014).
Research on social judgments, on the other hand, has also
pointed out that most judgmental biases reflect not so much
a lack of ability but rather a motivation to use a biased
set of cognitive strategies to solve a judgmental problem
(Kruglanski, 1989). Accuracy-motivated people typically expend
more cognitive effort on problem-related reasoning, attend to
relevant information more carefully, and process it more deeply,
often using more complex decision rules (Kunda, 1990). These
strategies were effective in reducing judgmental biases in many
tasks. For instance, experiments showed that social judgments of
an ambiguously described target person are less consistent with
primed constructs when participants had a strong goal to reach
an accurate impression about the target relative to a standard
condition in which participants were not explicitly instructed to
be accurate (e.g., Thompson et al., 1994; Ford and Kruglanski,
1995). Judgmental biases produced by priming can thus be
counteracted in priming tasks when people are motivated to use
cognitive strategies that are more appropriate to deal with an
unwanted priming influence. Blatant warnings against potential
biases and direct instructions to correct for them were most
often ineffective in this respect because they are too subtle for
a sustained accuracy motivation or they lead people to rely even
more on faulty judgment strategies (Wegner, 1994; Wegener and
Petty, 1997). Task procedures that motivate accurate responses
to the target on a sustained level may hence be more effective
to reduce a priming bias in the AMP, provided that participants
have appropriate control strategies at their disposal that can be
accessed at will (see Wilson and Brekke, 1994, for a general
discussion of this point).
The present research examined this hypothesis by increasing
the participants’ motivation to provide accurate judgments of the
targets. The typical AMP emphasizes intuitive judgments and
no error feedback is given because judgments based on personal
taste are required. These task features encourage spontaneous
judgments on the basis of momentary feeling because there is no
penalty (e.g., error feedback) for confusion of the affective source.
As a consequence, participants rely more on their intuitive
feelings in order to come up with a meaningful response to
a meaningless stimulus. The motivational setting is however
different when responses to the target could be correct and
incorrect. In such a task setting, an incorrect response to
the target creates some cost (i.e., the experience of an error).
Independent research suggests that participants are generally
motivated to avoid making errors (Hajcak and Foti, 2008). To
the degree that participants are motivated to report correct
evaluations of the targets, they should hence use cognitive
strategies that are better suited to disentangle affective a primes
and targets—or fail in their correction attempts if no such
strategies exist.
Automatic Response Priming
Even if participants are motivated to provide accurate responses,
it is possible that they are unable to do so due to an automatic
priming of motor responses. Such response priming is viable in a
standard AMP due to a fixed mapping of the evaluative response
options onto the response keys: Throughout an experimental
session, one response key is pressed if the target is rated as
positive, and the other response key is pressed if the target
is rated as negative. As a consequence, positive primes may
activate the response associated with a positive judgment and
negative primes may activate the response corresponding with
a negative judgment, even before processing of the target
(Gawronski et al., 2011; Eder et al., 2012). In support of this
hypothesis, Scherer and Lambert (2009) observed that affectively
neutral primes act like positive primes in the AMP when
they are presented with clearly negative primes, whereas they
act like positive primes when they are presented with clearly
negative primes. The authors explained this contrast effect
with a response-mapping framework: Participants automatically
impose a good/bad classification scheme onto the primes, even
when some of them are actually neutral. As a consequence,
neutral primes elicit a positive key response when presented with
negative primes and a negative key response when presented with
positive primes.
A recent study, however, provided evidence against a
response-priming explanation of AMP-effects. Gawronski and
Ye (2014) presented a modified version of an AMP in which
the assignment of the target responses to the response keys
was randomly determined for each trial, preventing an advance
preparation of key responses. Priming effects on evaluative and
semantic target responses occurred regardless of whether the key
assignment in the task was fixed or random. This (null) finding
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argues against a motor priming as the main cause of AMP-effects.
A priming of motor responses, however, is still plausible for
priming tasks in which participants prepare for categorizations of
affectively polarized targets with a fixed response mapping (Eder
et al., 2012). Therefore, we manipulated the response mapping in
a related way to control for a contribution of response priming to
AMP effects in our conditions.
The Present Research
To manipulate the motivation to provide accurate responses to
the targets, we had participants work on a modified AMP in
evaluation conditions vs. word-identification conditions. In the
evaluation conditions, native German speakers were instructed
to make spontaneous evaluative guesses about the meaning
of (allegedly Turkish) nonsense words whilst ignoring the
presentation of affective primes (angry and happy faces). Thus,
participants were explicitly informed about the presentation
of targets they could not decode semantically, similar to the
Chinese characters typically used in the AMP. And like in a
standard AMP, it was emphasized that they should follow their
spontaneous affective impressions during the judgment task.
Importantly, no error feedback was provided in this condition.
This condition hence resembles a standard AMP in which
judgments about stimuli could be neither correct nor incorrect.
In addition to a standard-evaluation condition with nonsense
targets only, we also realized a mixed-evaluation condition
in which participants categorized the valence of randomly
intermixed positive and negative words in addition to evaluations
of nonsense targets. This condition was implemented to direct
the participants’ attention to the targets, but here without
explicit error feedback and instructions to provide accurate
judgments.
In the word-identification conditions, by contrast, task
instructions stated that a familiar German word is presented in
every trial, when in fact only a few trials involved the presentation
of meaningful German words. More specifically, German words
with a clear positive or negative valence were presented in a
subset of the block trials for an individually adjusted time that
allowed for a correct (but imperfect) identification above chance.
In the majority of the trials, however, meaningless letter strings
were presented as targets for a very brief time that did not allow
for a conscious reading of the word. Trials with presentations
of meaningless letter strings were intermixed in a random and
unpredictable order, so that participants had to stay focused on
the targets in all trials for optimal performance. Participants
were instructed to categorize the evaluative meaning of the
target word as correctly as possible and to guess the target
valence if they could not read the target. In addition, participants
received an error feedback if the valence judgment was (allegedly)
correct or incorrect (i.e., even after presentations of nonsense
targets). We hypothesized that participants are motivated to
categorize the valence of targets (and not the primes) when
they receive feedback about correct and incorrect responses and
when they believe that a known word is presented in each trials.
Accordingly, participants should attempt to reduce intrusions by
the prime, selecting cognitive strategies that are less affected by
their presentations.
The role of response priming was examined by manipulating
advance knowledge of the response-mapping rules in a similar
way as Gawronski and Ye (2014) did in their study: In a fixed-
identification condition, the mapping of the affective judgments
onto the response keys was constant. One response key always
indicated a positive word, while the other response key indexed
a negative word judgment. In a variable-identification condition,
however, the assignment of the affective judgment to the response
keys could change from trial to trial, and participants did not
know in advance which key they must press in order to indicate
a positive or negative target. Given that direct activation of
the classification response through the prime requires advance
knowledge of the response mapping response priming should be
decreased in the variable-identification condition relative to the
fixed-identification condition. If response priming is not a main
cause of AMP-effects, no difference between these conditions
should be observed.
To summarize, following hypotheses were examined:
(1) Participants should rely less on their intuitive feelings
evoked by the primes when they are penalized for incorrect
responses and when they attempt to provide accurate
responses to the targets. Priming effects should hence be
reduced in the word-identification conditions relative to
the evaluation conditions that encourage a more lenient
response criterion. However, a priming effect should still
be obtained in the word-identification conditions if affective
feelings elicited by the primes are used automatically (i.e.,
unintentionally) for target judgment.
(2) If response priming is a main cause of AMP-effects, the size
of priming should be increased in the fixed-identification
condition in which participants have advance knowledge of
the response mapping relative to the variable-identification
condition in which participants do not know the assignment
of the categorization response to the response keys before
the priming phase. No difference between both conditions
is expected if response priming does not substantially
contribute to the AMP-effect, as concluded by Gawronski
and Ye (2014).
Methods
Participants
A total of 160 students (94 women, M age = 23.7 years,
SD = 5.3) with different majors participated in fulfillment of
course requirement or for payment. All participants had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision and were fluent in German.
None was proficient in Turkish language. Forty participants
were assigned to each of four different experimental conditions:
(1) a condition with a fixed response mapping in which
they categorized the valence of familiar German words and
guessed the valence of nonsense (allegedly German) words that
were presented too briefly for conscious identification (fixed-
identification condition); (3) an analogous word-identification
condition in which word categorizations were carried out with
a variable response mapping (variable-identification condition);
(3) a standard AMP condition in which they guessed the
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valence of nonsense (allegedly Turkish) words with a fixed
response-mapping (standard-evaluation condition); (4) an
analogous evaluation condition in which they categorized
additionally the valence of intermixed familiar German words
(mixed-evaluation condition). Participants signed a written
informed consent before participation. Previous studies using
similar procedures with affectively polarized primes obtained
strong AMP-effects with standardized effect sizes (Cohen’s
d) ranging from 1.38 to 2.44 (Payne et al., 2005). Therefore,
we collected data from 40 participants for each condition,
which provides sufficient power to detect a strong AMP effect
(P = 0.97).
Design
The experimental design in the word-identification and in the
mixed-evaluation conditions was a 2 (prime: happy vs. angry)× 3
(target: positive vs. negative vs. nonsense) factorial design. Each
participant worked through 8 experimental blocks. Each block
consisted of 16 trials with nonsense targets (preceded by 8 happy
and 8 angry primes), 4 trials with positive targets and 4 trials
with negative targets (preceded by 2 happy and 2 angry primes,
respectively), resulting in 24 trials per block that were intermixed
in random order. Nonsense targets (drawn from the practice
set) replaced positive and negative target words in the standard-
evaluation condition (i.e., only nonsense targets were presented
in this condition), resulting in a 2 (prime: happy vs. angry) × 1
(target: nonsense) factorial design.
Apparatus and Stimuli
Prime stimuli were 48 happy faces and 48 angry faces that were
selected from a standardized picture set (KDEF; Lundqvist et al.,
1998). Half of the displayed faces were female, the other half
showed male persons. Affective target stimuli were 32 clearly
positive (M = 2.2, SD = 0.37) and 32 clearly negative adjectives
(M = −2.2, SD = 0.48) that were selected from a standardized
word pool on the basis of their evaluative norms (Schwibbe et al.,
1981). The subsets of positive and negative adjectives did not
differ in valence extremity, frequency of usage, or number of
letters (range: 5–9), with all Fs < 1. Neutral target stimuli were
64 nonsense words (e.g., muganni) of ascending length (range:
5–9 letters). An additional 12 nonsense words were created for
task practice. Response keys were the two buttons of a computer
mouse.
Procedure
Word-identification Conditions
Participants completed first an adjustment phase and then a test
phase. In the adjustment phase, the presentation duration of
meaningful target words was individually adjusted to establish
an ambiguous word identification task for the test phase.
Participants performed five blocks with 12 trials each that
involved the presentation of a positive or negative adjective with
equal probability (i.e., only familiar words with a clear positive
or negative valence were shown in this phase). Target words
were the same adjectives that were later presented as targets
in the experimental phase. They were randomly drawn from
the word pool without replacement. Each trial started with the
brief presentation (100ms) of an asterisk as a fixation mark
in the middle of the screen. After an additional interval of
100ms, a white premask (nine X) was presented for one screen
refresh cycle (14ms), immediately followed by the adjective that
stayed on the screen for an individually set presentation time
(starting with 114ms in the first block). The target word was
followed by a white postmask (nine X) for 100ms, followed by
a blank screen for 250ms. A judgment screen then appeared
that asked the participant for his or her valence judgment with
a corresponding left or right mouse button press depending on
the experimental condition (see details on the response-mapping
below). An arbitrary time limit of 2 s was set for the judgment
but no emphasis was put on the speed of the response. At the
end of a trial, participants were informed about incorrect valence
judgments and/or time limit violations if any. The next trial
started after 800ms.
After each block, the word presentation time was adjusted
using a staircase procedure to achieve a valence identification rate
ranging between 7 and 10 correct identifications in a block (for a
similar procedure see Eder and Klauer, 2007). The presentation
time was decreased by one screen refresh cycle (14ms) when
the error rate was equal or lower than 16%. It was increased
by one cycle when the error rate was equal or above 41%.
The final presentation time was computed by averaging across
presentation times of the last three blocks (rounded up or down
to the next multiple of the refresh cycle).
The sequence of events in the subsequent test phase was
identical with that of the identification task in the adjustment
phase, with the exceptions that (1) a picture of a facial emotional
expression was now presented before the word and (2) the
presentation of nonsense target stimuli in the majority of trials
that were presented too briefly for conscious identification.
Figure 1 shows the sequence of events in this phase. Participants
were informed in the task instructions that a picture will now
appear before the word. However, it was also stated that the
picture is completely irrelevant for that task at hand (i.e., word
categorization), and that it should therefore be ignored. The
final word presentation time of the adjustment phase set the
presentation duration of the positive and negative words in the
first experimental block but was still adjusted (if necessary) after
each block according to the staircase procedure detailed above.
The presentation time of the nonsense targets was fixed to brief
42ms, which was too brief for a conscious identification of
the sandwich-masked stimuli (see Eder and Klauer, 2007). An
incorrect valence judgment was reported back in half of these
trials to maintain the illusion of a meaningful word presentation
in every trial. Error feedback was still veridical in the trials with
presentations of words as targets.
Judgmental responses to the target stimuli were entered
differently in the experimental conditions. In the fixed-mapping
condition, one mouse button was pressed to indicate a positive
target meaning, while the other mouse button indicated
a negative target meaning (counterbalanced assignment)
throughout the experimental session, which corresponds with a
typical affect-misattribution procedure. In the variable-mapping
condition, the same mouse buttons were used for the target
judgment but the assignment of the classification responses
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FIGURE 1 | Sequence of events in an experimental trial in the word-identification conditions. Evaluative decisions were entered with left and right mouse
button presses. The meaning of a key press was indexed by the respective location of response labels on left and right positions at the computer screen. In the fixed
word-identification condition, the location of the response labels (i.e., the response mapping) was constant. In the variable word-identification condition, the location of
the response labels varied unpredictably from trial to trial (see text for further explanation).
could vary from trial to trial. Participants were informed
about the response mapping at the time of the judgmental
response and each of the two assignments appeared with equal
probability in each block (for details see Eder and Klauer, 2007).
Thus, participants could not anticipate the motor response
that corresponds with the prime valence during the priming
phase.
Following the test phase, participants were probed for their
awareness of the nonsense targets in the word-identification
conditions with following questions: (i) “Which hypotheses do
you think were investigated in this study?” (ii) “Did you have a
strategy for the evaluation of the target?” (iii) “Did you recognize
any words that were presented near to the perceptual threshold?
If yes, what words?” (iv) “Did you encounter any problems?” A
final question asked directly whether an adjective appeared in
every trial, which was answered by selecting “yes” or “no.”
Evaluation Conditions
No adjustment phase was necessary for these conditions. Instead,
the test phase started immediately following six practice trials
that illustrated the judgment procedure with clearly visible
nonsense stimuli. For the standard-evaluation condition, the
presentation time of the targets was fixed to brief 200ms (without
adjustments) and feedback was provided only on late responses.
In the mixed-evaluation condition, 4 trials with positive and
4 trials with negative target words were intermixed in a trial
block (see Design above) and no feedback was provided on the
correctness of the valence categorization in these trials. The
mapping of the valence categorization to the mouse buttons
was fixed in both evaluation conditions (counterbalanced across
participants).
Results
Priming effects were calculated by subtracting the proportion
of positive judgments on trials with a negative prime from
the proportion of positive responses on trials with a positive
prime. Internal consistency of the priming scores was assessed
for each condition with the use of an odd-even split that
divided the trials with positive and negative primes in two
subsets depending on whether these trials were associated with
an odd or even trial number (cf. Gawronski et al., 2010).
For all analyses, the significance criterion was set to p <
0.05 (two-tailed). Standardized effect size (Cohen’s d) and
the 0.95 confidence intervals of the effect size are reported
when appropriate. Analyses of the post-experimental suspicion
measure are reported in an Appendix.
Valence Categorization of Nonsense Targets
The proportion of positive judgments in trials with nonsense
targets was analyzed using a mixed 2 (prime) × 4 (condition)
analysis of variance (ANOVA). The main effect of condition
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was significant, F(1, 156) = 5.44, p < 0.05, d = 0.65.
The proportion of positive judgments was lower in the mixed-
evaluation condition relative to the remaining conditions. More
important, the main effect of prime reached significance. As
displayed in Figure 2, participants were more likely to judge a
nonsense word as positive following a happy face compared to an
angry face in every condition, F(1, 156) = 53.61, p < 0.001, d =
1.17. The interaction between both factors missed significance,
F(1, 156) = 1.92, p = 0.13.
Follow-up tests of AMP-effects (difference between prime-
congruent and prime-incongruent judgmental responses) against
zero were significant in the fixed-identification condition (1M =
0.06, d = 0.74, 95% CI [0.39, 1.09]), t(39) = 4.67, p < 0.001;
in the variable-identification condition (1M = 0.05, d = 0.49,
95% CI [0.16, 0.82]), t(39) = 3.09, p < 0.01; in the mixed-
evaluation condition (1M = 0.12, d = 0.50, 95% CI [0.16,
0.83]); and in the standard-evaluation condition (1M = 0.11,
d = 0.90, 95% CI [0.53, 1.26]), t(39) = 5.72, p < 0.001. Thus,
affective priming was observed in all conditions including the
word-identification conditions (Hypothesis 1). Reliability of the
priming scores was however insufficient in the fixed-identification
and variable-identification conditions with r = 0.04 and r =
0.15, respectively; in contrast, priming effects were reliable in the
mixed-evaluation condition: r = 0.75 (p < 0.001), and in the
standard-evaluation condition: r = 0.66 (p < 0.001).
An additional analysis was performed to examine an
influence of accuracy motivation on the size of priming effects.
Experimental conditions were dummy-coded into those with
a high motivation to provide accurate responses (the word-
identification conditions) and those with a low motivation
to respond accurately (the evaluation conditions). A t-test
(independent samples) revealed stronger AMP effects in
the evaluation conditions relative to the word-identification
conditions, t(158) = 2.38, p < 0.05, d = 0.38. In short,
effect size was reduced in conditions with a high motivation to
provide accurate responses (Hypothesis 1). Priming effects in
the standard-evaluation condition and in the mixed-evaluation
conditions were not different (t < 1). A comparison of effects in
the fixed-identification and the variable-identification conditions
also produced no difference (t < 1). Thus, effect sizes were
not different with advance knowledge of the response mapping,
suggesting that automatic response priming does not contribute
to affective priming in the AMP (Hypothesis 2).
Valence Categorization of Words
Rates of correct word categorizations in the word-identification
conditions and in the mixed-evaluation condition were analyzed
for a priming influence and whether participants in the word-
identification conditions followed instructions to categorize the
targets. The mean adjusted presentation duration for the affective
words in the word-identification conditions was 75ms (SD =
28ms). The mean proportions of correct word evaluations were
74% (SD = 7.1) in the variable-identification condition and
72% (SD = 6.3) in the fixed-identification condition without
significant difference, t(78) = 1.04, p > 0.10. The identification
rates were however significantly higher than chance (P = 50%)
in both conditions, t(39) = 21.36, p < 0.001, d = 3.38, and
t(39) = 22.53, p < 0.001, d = 3.56, confirming that participants
categorized targets. Accuracy in the mixed-evaluation condition
with a fixed presentation time of the affective word was at a
comparable level (M = 76%, SD = 14.7), t(39) = 11.01, p <
0.001, d = 3.53.
A priming influence on affective word categorizations was
analyzed using a 2 (prime valence) × 2 (target valence) × 3
FIGURE 2 | Proportion of positive categorizations of nonsense targets as a function of affective prime and experimental condition. Error bars display the
95% CI of the mean value.
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(condition: fixed identification vs. variable condition vs. mixed-
evaluation) ANOVA. Table 1 shows the proportion of correct
target categorizations in each priming condition. The main
effect of target valence was significant, indicating more accurate
categorizations of positive words, F(1, 117) = 4.30, p < 0.05, d =
0.38. The prime × target interaction, F(1, 117) = 10.58, p < 0.01,
d = 0.60, and the three-way interaction reached also significance,
F(1, 117) = 3.65, p < 0.05, d = 0.50. All other effects were not
significant (with ps > 0.20). Follow-up tests of priming effects in
each condition revealed significant priming effects in the mixed-
evaluation condition, F(1, 39) = 8.02, p < 0.01, d = 0.91, and
in the fixed-identification condition, F(1, 39) = 6.06, p < 0.05,
d = 0.79, but not in the variable-identification condition (F < 1).
Thus, affective priming of word categorizations was observed
only in the conditions with a fixed-response mapping.
Discussion
The present research examined whether participants could
escape from priming in a modified AMP task when they have
a motivation to provide accurate responses to the targets. In
the word-identification conditions, participants were motivated
to categorize targets by being made to believe that a familiar
word was presented in each trial and by providing error feedback
on (allegedly) inaccurate categorizations. Results showed that
evaluative categorizations of masked nonsense targets were
affected by prior presentations of task-irrelevant happy and angry
facial picture primes: Meaningless letter strings (presented too
briefly for conscious identification) were judged more often
positive when they appeared after happy primes relative to angry
primes. Furthermore, participants categorized clearly visible
positive and negative words correctly, showing that participants
were indeed motivated to respond to the targets. In combination,
these findings demonstrate that affective priming is observed
even in conditions in which participants have a motivation to
reduce a biasing influence by the primes, supporting previous
conclusions that a misattribution of affective responses from the
primes to the targets is unintended (Payne et al., 2005).
However, a comparison of different AMP conditions also
showed that priming effects in the word-identification conditions
were diminished and less reliable relative to typical AMP
conditions in which participants were aware of presentations of
nonsense targets (evaluation conditions). This difference shows
that a motivation to provide accurate responses can attenuate
the influence of affective primes to some extent, suggesting
that participants have at least partial control over a priming
influence. From the present research, it cannot be concludedwhat
mechanisms were responsible for the attenuated priming effects
in the word-identification conditions. One possibility is that
participants gave less weight to their spontaneous feelings during
the judgment task, which may have an attenuating effect that is
opposite to the one when participants are explicitly encouraged
to rely more on their spontaneous feelings (De Houwer and
Tucker Smith, 2013). A strategic weighting of “gut feelings” may
hence work in both directions. Alternatively, it is possible that
the categorization task and the emphasis on accuracy induced
an analytical thinking mode that is known to disrupt holistic
impressions and intuitions based on affective cues (e.g., Wilson
and Schooler, 1991; Halberstadt, 2010). Another possibility is
that the error feedback triggered behavioral adjustments that
minimize a priming influence in the next trial. For instance,
Frings and Wentura (2008) observed that affective priming in a
valence categorization task is attenuated after incongruent trials
(with typically more incorrect responses) relative to congruent
trials. Sequential modulations of this sort are typically explained
with reactive behavioral adjustments following conflict and/or
errors that reduce interference by irrelevant primes (Dignath
et al., 2015). Reactive adjustments on a trial-to-trial basis can
also explain why the internal consistency of the priming scores
approached zero in the word-identification conditions. Strategic
adjustments in cognitive control after error feedback can hence
explain why the AMP-effect was attenuated and less reliable
in the word-identification conditions. A third possibility is
enhanced attention to the relevant target information, which
is known to reduce priming effects in other priming tasks
(e.g., Musch and Klauer, 2001). In respect to this explanation
it should be noted, however, that priming effects were not
attenuated in a mixed-evaluation condition that analogously
directed the participants’ attention to the targets (as indexed by
the accurate judgments of intermixed affective words). Thus, an
explanation with differences in selective attention only is not
supported. More research is needed on the specific mechanisms
underlying the impact of accuracy motivation on priming effects
in the AMP.
Advance knowledge of the response mapping in the word-
identification conditions had no effect on the size of the
AMP effect, which replicates the result of an earlier study
that concluded first that response-priming provides no viable
explanation of priming effects in the AMP (Gawronski and Ye,
2014). Given the interpretation of a null finding, it is reassuring
to know that the present study reaches the same conclusion
with different material and with an increased sample size (the
TABLE 1 | Proportion of correct evaluations of positive and negative target words (in percent) as a function of prime valence and experimental condition.
Variable-identification Fixed-identification Mixed-evaluation
Positive target Negative target Positive target Negative target Positive target Negative target
Happy prime 74.2 (15.5) 74.5 (14.3) 78.0 (9.9) 68.6 (12.7) 83.1 (20.7) 67.5 (24.0)
Angry prime 73.0 (15.9) 73.9 (12.4) 72.3 (13.3) 70.5 (16.3) 74.4 (25.9) 77.3 (15.0)
Standard deviation in parentheses.
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present study: N = 80; Gawronski and Ye: N = 55).
However, analyses of correct word categorizations also showed
significant affective priming effects only for the conditions with
a fixed-response mapping and not for the condition with a
variable-response mapping. It is unclear why advance knowledge
of the response mapping influenced affective priming only
in trials with affective word categorizations and not in trials
with presentations of nonsense targets. Due to the random
intermixing procedure, participants could not anticipate whether
a word is presented after the prime, ruling out differences in
the strength of response preparation as a possible explanation.
Clearly, more research is needed on this unexpected finding.
The observation of a priming effect in conditions with a
high accuracy motivation is also important in respect to a
recent discussion about the implicit nature of AMP effects. Bar-
Anan and Nosek (2012) concluded from a series of large-scale
internet studies that the psychometric qualities of the AMP are
related to participants’ self-reported intention to evaluate the
prime (instead of the target). Participants who reported that they
intentionally categorized the primes exhibited larger effect sizes,
higher reliability, and stronger associations with other attitude
measures relative to people whowere not aware of and/or ignored
the primes. This research questioned the status of the AMP as an
implicit measurement procedure of attitudes. However, another
study provided evidence that participants made up a response
strategy after their behavior to justify a judgment bias (Payne
et al., 2013). Furthermore, Gawronski and Ye (2015) showed a
reliable priming of affective judgments even when participants
were unaware of affective responses to the primes. Thus, evidence
is accumulating that affective primes influence judgments in the
AMP even when participants are unaware of and/or motivated to
control for an influence of the primes, confirming that the AMP
has a potential for an implicit measurement of attitudes.
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Appendix
Suspicion of Nonsense Target Presentations in
the Word-identification Conditions
No participant indicated suspicion of nonsense targets in
the post-experimental questionnaire. However, 18 (out of 40)
participants in the variable-identification condition and 19 (out
of 40) participants in the fixed-identification condition did not
believe that a familiar word was presented in every trial. These
participants were classified as being suspicious of presentations
of nonsense targets. In an ANOVA of the priming effects
(i.e., the difference in positive judgments following positive
and negative primes) with condition (variable-identification vs.
fixed-identification condition) and suspicion as between-subjects
factors, only the interaction between condition and suspicion
reached significance, F(1, 76) = 4.76, p < 0.05, d = 0.50. Follow-
up comparisons (Fisher’s LSD test) revealed significantly stronger
effects in the variable-identification condition when participants
had no suspicion in respect to presentations of nonsense targets
relative to suspicious participants (p = 0.02), while suspicion
did not influence AMP-effects in the fixed-identification condition
(p = 0.48). If anything, suspicion of nonsense targets in the
word-identification conditions thus appeared to decrease the
priming influence.
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